№ 3/2016

Fìnansi Ukr. 2016 (3): 34–53

MARKET OF FINANCIAL SERVICES

DYBA Oleksandr ¹, KIKOT Oleksandr

¹SHEE “Kyiv National Economic University named after Vadym Hetman”
OrcID ID : https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3615-1180

Evaluation of the operation of securities auctions

The popularity of auctions as a mechanism for selling securities, existence of different auction formats, and alternative selling mechanisms creates a need for the sound auction evaluation and comparison procedure. This article presents a securities auction evaluation procedure that consists of seven steps, each of which is analyzed and described in detail. As well as a classification of evaluation types is offered and some aspects of evaluation during the auction process are discussed. The essence of preliminary, interim, and final evaluations are examined, as well as peculiarities of using theoretical, statistical, econometrical and experimental methods to the process of evaluating securities auctions. Careful consideration is given to goals of a securities seller and functional characteristics of auctions that form a basis for the system of evaluation criteria. The system of evaluation criteria is developed and the essence of each criterion is addressed in detail. The most important criteria include expected yield, variability of revenue, allocation efficiency, ability to prevent manipulation and collusion of bidders, operational stability, transparency of trading, ease of practical implementation and complexity of preparing bibs. The last part of this article is devoted to general problems relating to the evaluation of securities auctions. Findings will improve the evaluation and comparison of different auction formats for trading in securities, and, therefore, increase the effectiveness of using evaluation procedures in economic activities of government-owned and private entities.

Keywords:auction, securities, evaluation, evaluation criteria, auction yield, auction allocation efficiency.

JEL: G11, G12.

DYBA O. . Evaluation of the operation of securities auctions / O. . DYBA, O. Kikot // Фінанси України. - 2016. - № 3. - C. 34-53.

Article original in Ukrainian (pp. 34 - 53)

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