№ 7/2023

Fìnansi Ukr. 2023 (7): 54–79https://doi.org/10.33763/finukr2023.07.054

MONETARY POLICY

BORTNIKOV Gennadiy ¹, LYUBICH Oleksandr ², KHOKHYCH Dmytro ³, DRACHKO-YERMOLENKO Ievgenii ⁴

¹SESE “The Academy of Financial Management”
OrcID ID : https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8388-6721
²SESE “The Academy of Financial Management”
OrcID ID : https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9339-4242
³Kyiv National Economic University named after Vadym Hetman
OrcID ID : https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3787-939X
⁴SESE “The Academy of Financial Management”
OrcID ID : https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0119-4014

Monetary policy committees in the conditions of the coronavirus pandemic outbreak

Introduction. In conditions of systemic shocks, such as the coronavirus pandemic, monetary policy decision-making requires collegiality. Monetary policy committees (MPCs) are a successful institutional solution in the conditions of information asymmetry and available alternatives for responding with monetary measures to dynamic changes in the economy and shocks.
Problem Statement. In Ukraine, at the level of the central bank and in the scientific opinion, the role and status of the MPCs in ensuring financial stability is underestimated, which is perceived more as a working body of the Board of the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU). The formation of its composition which includes only top managers of the NBU does not guarantee against the adoption of biased or short-sighted decisions, which can lead to negative consequences for economic growth. There is a need to bring the principles of this collegial body into line with the best practices of central banks.
Purpose.To generalize international experience in the institutional development of national central banks in the direction of the corporate structure of the monetary policy committee to ensure greater efficiency of its work and the application of best practices in Ukraine.
Methods. Content analysis, methods of scientific abstraction, comparative analysis of statistical information published by central banks of countries that are not part of the European Central Bank system were used.
Results. The coronavirus pandemic did not cause significant changes in the organization of committee activities, but it increased the importance of involving external experts to assess and forecast the situation. The analysis of the biographical data of such persons showed that they are highly qualified specialists, recognized in the country and by the international community. In the decisions of individual political bodies the reference to the expectations of the market participants (for example, the prediction of the decision related to maintainance , increase or decrease of the discount rate) deserves special attention as well as the requirement for the members of the body to observe a period of “silence” for at least one week, which means refraining from comments on the statement of position before the meeting. Of course, the practice of involvement the representatives of the Ministry of Finance in meetings of the committee without voting rights is of interest.
Conclusions. Monetary policy committees work primarily to ensure price stability, but with a perspective for economic development. The main functions of MPCs in most European countries are not limited to setting the discount rate, but cover reserve requirements, approval of liquidity support programs and refinancing of banks, operations of the central bank in the foreign exchange market and with securities. For Ukraine, it is considered optimal to form MPCs not under the Board, but under the National Bank itself in order to raise its status to the level of a decision-making body. For this amendments should be made to the Law “On the National Bank of Ukraine” and regulations or provisions on the MPCs should be developed. The participation of external experts in the committee is necessary for making informed decisions. Their level of qualification should be confirmed by a doctorate in economics or finance and the status of professor, a solid list of scientific publications and experience of participation in international research. Management experience in public financial corporations, central banks and departments or large financial institutions is desirable. In our opinion, the participation of politicians in the committee is inappropriate, because in the current conditions it will only undermine the independence of the central bank.

Keywords:monetary policy, central bank, key rate, coronavirus pandemic, systemic crisis, banking system

JEL: E52, E58

Bortnikov G. . Monetary policy committees in the conditions of the coronavirus pandemic outbreak / G. . Bortnikov, O. . Lyubich, D. . KHOKHYCH, I. Drachko-Yermolenko // Фінанси України. - 2023. - № 7. - C. 54-79.

Article original in Ukrainian (pp. 54 - 79)

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